Question 1.
Which statement is true about RSTP topology changes?

A. Any change in the state of the port generates a TC BPDU.
B. Only nonedge ports moving to the forwarding state generate a TC BPDU.
C. If either an edge port or a nonedge port moves to a block state, then a TC BPDU is generated.
D. Only edge ports moving to the blocking state generate a TC BPDU.
E. Any loss of connectivity generates a TC BPDU.

Answer: B

Explanation:
The IEEE 802.1D Spanning Tree Protocol was designed to keep a switched or bridged network loop free, with adjustments made to the network topology dynamically. A topology change typically takes 30 seconds, where a port moves from the Blocking state to the Forwarding state after two intervals of the Forward Delay timer. As technology has improved, 30 seconds has become an unbearable length of time to wait for a production network to failover or "heal" itself during a problem.
Topology Changes and RSTP
Recall that when an 802.1D switch detects a port state change (either up or down), it signals the Root Bridge by sending topology change notification (TCN) BPDUs. The Root Bridge must then signal a topology change by sending out a TCN message that is relayed to all switches in the STP domain. RSTP detects a topology change only when a nonedge port transitions to the Forwarding state. This might seem odd because a link failure is not used as a trigger. RSTP uses all of its rapid convergence mechanisms to prevent bridging loops from forming. Therefore, topology changes are detected only so that bridging tables can be updated and corrected as hosts appear first on a failed port and then on a different functioning port. When a topology change is detected, a switch must propagate news of the change to other switches in the network so they can correct their bridging tables, too. This process is similar to the convergence and synchronization mechanism-topology change (TC) messages propagate through the network in an everexpanding wave.

Question 2.
Refer to the exhibit.

Which four statements about this GLBP topology are true? (Choose four.)

A. Router A is responsible for answering ARP requests sent to the virtual IP address.
B. If router A becomes unavailable, router B forwards packets sent to the virtual MAC address of  
    router A.
C. If another router is added to this GLBP group, there would be two backup AVGs.
D. Router B is in GLBP listen state.
E. Router A alternately responds to ARP requests with different virtual MAC addresses.
F. Router B transitions from blocking state to forwarding state when it becomes the AVG.

Answer: A, B, D, E

Explanation:
With GLBP the following is true:
With GLB, there is 1 AVG and 1 standby VG. In this case Company1 is the AVG and Company2 is the standby. Company2 would act as a VRF and would already be forwarding and routing packets. Any additional routers would be in a listen state. As the role of the Active VG and load balancing, Company1 responds to ARP requests with different virtual MAC addresses. In this scenario, Company2 is the Standby VF for the VMAC 0008.b400.0101 and would become the Active VF if Company1 were down. As the role of the Active VG, the primary responsibility is to answer ARP requests to the virtual IP address. As an AVF router Company2 is already forwarding/routing packets

Question 3.
Refer to the exhibit.

Which VRRP statement about the roles of the master virtual router and the backup virtual router is true?

A. Router A is the master virtual router, and router B is the backup virtual router. When router A 
    fails, router B becomes the master virtual router. When router A recovers, router B maintains 
    the role of master virtual router.
B. Router A is the master virtual router, and router B is the backup virtual router. When router A 
    fails, router B becomes the master virtual router. When router A recovers, it regains the master 
    virtual router role.
C. Router B is the master virtual router, and router A is the backup virtual router. When router B 
    fails, router A becomes the master virtual router. When router B recovers, router A maintains 
    the role of master virtual router.
D. Router B is the master virtual router, and router A is the backup virtual router. When router B 
    fails, router A becomes the master virtual router. When router B recovers, it regains the master  
    virtual router role.

Answer: B

Explanation:

Question 4.
Which description correctly describes a MAC address flooding attack?

A. The attacking device crafts ARP replies intended for valid hosts. The MAC address of the 
    attacking device then becomes the destination address found in the Layer 2 frames sent by the  
    valid network device.
B. The attacking device crafts ARP replies intended for valid hosts. The MAC address of the  
    attacking device then becomes the source address found in the Layer 2 frames sent by the  
    valid network device.
C. The attacking device spoofs a destination MAC address of a valid host currently in the CAM 
    table. The switch then forwards frames destined for the valid host to the attacking device.
D. The attacking device spoofs a source MAC address of a valid host currently in the CAM table. 
    The switch then forwards frames destined for the valid host to the attacking device.
E. Frames with unique, invalid destination MAC addresses flood the switch and exhaust CAM  
    table space. The result is that new entries cannot be inserted because of the exhausted CAM  
    table space, and traffic is subsequently flooded out all ports.
F. Frames with unique, invalid source MAC addresses flood the switch and exhaust CAM table  
    space. The result is that new entries cannot be inserted because of the exhausted CAM table  
    space, and traffic is subsequently flooded out all ports.

Answer: F

Explanation:

Question 5.
Refer to the exhibit.
An attacker is connected to interface Fa0/11 on switch A-SW2 and attempts to establish a DHCP server for a man-in-middle attack. 

Which recommendation, if followed, would mitigate this type of attack?

A. All switch ports in the Building Access block should be configured as DHCP trusted ports.
B. All switch ports in the Building Access block should be configured as DHCP untrusted ports.
C. All switch ports connecting to hosts in the Building Access block should be configured as 
    DHCP trusted ports.
D. All switch ports connecting to hosts in the Building Access block should be configured as 
    DHCP untrusted ports.
E. All switch ports in the Server Farm block should be configured as DHCP untrusted ports.
F. All switch ports connecting to servers in the Server Farm block should be configured as DHCP 
   untrusted ports.

Answer: D

Explanation:
One of the ways that an attacker can gain access to network traffic is to spoof responses that would be sent by a valid DHCP server. The DHCP spoofing device replies to client DHCP requests. The legitimate server may reply also, but if the spoofing device is on the same segment as the client, its reply to the client may arrive first. The intruder’s DHCP reply offers an IP address and supporting information that designates the intruder as the default gateway or Domain Name System (DNS) server. In the case of a gateway, the clients will then forward packets to the attacking device, which will in turn send them to the desired destination. This is referred to as a “man-in-the-middle” attack, and it may go entirely undetected as the intruder intercepts the data flow through the network. Untrusted ports are those that are not explicitly configured as trusted. A DHCP binding table is built for untrusted ports. Each entry contains the client MAC address, IP address, lease time, binding type, VLAN number, and port ID recorded as clients make DHCP requests. The table is then used to filter subsequent DHCP traffic. From a DHCP snooping perspective, untrusted access ports should not send any DHCP server responses, such as DHCPOFFER, DHCPACK, DHCPNAK.

Question 6.
Refer to the exhibit. 
The web servers WS_1 and WS_2 need to be accessed by external and internal users. For security reasons, the servers should not communicate with each other, although they are located on the same subnet. However, the servers do need to communicate with a database server located in the inside network. 

Which configuration isolates the servers from each other?

A. The switch ports 3/1 and 3/2 are defined as secondary VLAN isolated ports. The ports 
    connecting to the two firewalls are defined as primary VLAN promiscuous ports.
B. The switch ports 3/1 and 3/2 are defined as secondary VLAN community ports. The ports  
    connecting to the two firewalls are defined as primary VLAN promiscuous ports.
C. The switch ports 3/1 and 3/2 and the ports connecting to the two firewalls are defined as  
   primary VLAN promiscuous ports.
D. The switch ports 3/1 and 3/2 and the ports connecting to the two firewalls are defined as  
   primary VLAN community ports.

Answer: A

Explanation:
Service providers often have devices from multiple clients, in addition to their own servers, on a single Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) segment or VLAN. As security issues proliferate, it becomes necessary to provide traffic isolation between devices, even though they may exist on the same Layer 3 segment and VLAN. Catalyst 6500/4500 switches implement PVLANs to keep some switch ports shared and some switch ports isolated, although all ports exist on the same VLAN. The 2950 and 3550 support “protected ports,” which are functionality similar to PVLANs on a perswitch basis. 
A port in a PVLAN can be one of three types:
Isolated: An isolated port has complete Layer 2 separation from other ports within the same PVLAN, except for the promiscuous port. PVLANs block all traffic to isolated ports, except the traffic from promiscuous ports. Traffic received from an isolated port is forwarded to only promiscuous ports.
Promiscuous: A promiscuous port can communicate with all ports within the PVLAN, including the community and isolated ports. The default gateway for the segment would likely be hosted on a promiscuous port, given that all devices in the PVLAN will need to communicate with that port.
Community: Community ports communicate among themselves and with their promiscuous ports. These interfaces are isolated at Layer 2 from all other interfaces in other communities, or in isolated ports within their PVLAN.

Question 7.
What does the command udld reset accomplish?

A. allows a UDLD port to automatically reset when it has been shut down
B. resets all UDLD enabled ports that have been shut down
C. removes all UDLD configurations from interfaces that were globally enabled
D. removes all UDLD configurations from interfaces that were enabled per-port

Answer: B

Explanation:

Question 8.
Refer to the exhibit.
Dynamic ARP Inspection is enabled only on switch SW_A. Host_A and Host_B acquire their IP addresses from the DHCP server connected to switch SW_A. 

What would the outcome be if Host_B initiated an ARP spoof attack toward Host_A ?

A. The spoof packets are inspected at the ingress port of switch SW_A and are permitted.
B. The spoof packets are inspected at the ingress port of switch SW_A and are dropped.
C. The spoof packets are not inspected at the ingress port of switch SW_A and are permitted.
D. The spoof packets are not inspected at the ingress port of switch SW_A and are dropped.

Answer: C

Explanation:
When configuring DAI, follow these guidelines and restrictions:
• DAI is an ingress security feature; it does not perform any egress checking.
• DAI is not effective for hosts connected to routers that do not support DAI or that do not have this feature enabled. Because man-in-the-middle attacks are limited to a single Layer 2 broadcast domain, separate the domain with DAI checks from the one with no checking. This action secures the ARP caches of hosts in the domain enabled for DAI.
• DAI depends on the entries in the DHCP snooping binding database to verify IP-to-MAC address bindings in incoming ARP requests and ARP responses. Make sure to enable DHCP snooping to permit ARP packets that have dynamically assigned IP addresses.
• When DHCP snooping is disabled or in non-DHCP environments, use ARP ACLs to permit or to deny packets.
• DAI is supported on access ports, trunk ports, EtherChannel ports, and private VLAN ports.
In our example, since Company2 does not have DAI enabled (bullet point 2 above) packets will not be inspected and they will be permitted.

Reference:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/routers/7600/ios/12.2SXF/configuration/guide/dynarp.html

Question 9.
Which statement is true about Layer 2 security threats?

A. MAC spoofing, in conjunction with ARP snooping, is the most effective counter-measure 
    against reconnaissance attacks that use Dynamic ARP Inspection to determine vulnerable 
    attack points.
B. DHCP snooping sends unauthorized replies to DHCP queries.
C. ARP spoofing can be used to redirect traffic to counter Dynamic ARP Inspection.
D. Dynamic ARP Inspection in conjunction with ARP spoofing can be used to counter DHCP  
    snooping attacks.
E. MAC spoofing attacks allow an attacking device to receive frames intended for a different  
    network host.
F. Port scanners are the most effective defense against Dynamic ARP Inspection.

Answer: E

Explanation:
First of all, MAC spoofing is not an effective counter-measure against any reconnaissance attack; it IS an attack! Furthermore, reconnaissance attacks don't use dynamic ARP inspection (DAI); DAI is a switch feature used to prevent attacks.

Question 10.
What does the global configuration command ip arp inspection vlan 10-12,15 accomplish?

A. validates outgoing ARP requests for interfaces configured on VLAN 10, 11, 12, or 15
B. intercepts all ARP requests and responses on trusted ports
C. intercepts, logs, and discards ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC address bindings
D. discards ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC address bindings on trusted ports

Answer: C

Explanation:
The “ip arp inspection” command enables Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) for the specified VLANs. DAI is a security feature that validates Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets in a network. DAI allows a network administrator to intercept, log, and discard ARP packets with invalid MAC address to IP address bindings. This capability protects the network from certain "man-in-themiddle" attacks.

Reference:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12.1/20ew/configuration/guide/dynarp.html

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